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 LEGISLATIVE THEORY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
 SOME COMMENTS ON RUBIN
 Peter L. Strauss*
 Professor Rubin's article is an admirable piece of work on many
 levels, from its attention to jurisprudence to its concern with the practi-
 cal changes in the Congress and its function, and their implications. In
 commenting on it, I mean to restrict myself to the latter subjects.
 These are the matters that have the closest tangency to my own work
 and produce for me the strongest response. Professor Rubin has given
 us a compelling statement of the problems posed for contemporary
 constitutional and legislative theory by one transformation in statutory
 practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state, the change
 from direct ("transitive") legislative resolution of policy problems to
 indirect ("intransitive") resolution through the empowerment of agents
 who are to determine policy problems under instruction. These
 changes, he argues, undercut such conventional doctrinal norms as
 "delegation" and "void-for-vagueness" as means for assessing legisla-
 tive action.
 One encounters the changes Professor Rubin describes on every
 hand. They are almost certainly irreversible, given the increasingly
 complex and interdependent ways in which we understand our exis-
 tence. As a description of changes and as an assessment of the corre-
 sponding inadequacies of our existing models and theories about
 legislation, his essay is compelling. What a commentary might hope to
 do is to suggest a series of next steps in the analysis, further questions
 that might be asked as we seek to develop the new body of legislative
 theory for which he calls.
 For this reader, at least, not all of Professor Rubin's suggestions
 about future directions are equally as compelling as his assessment of
 the current situation. This is in part because of the need to develop a
 sharper picture than he gives us of just who the actors really are that
 count in a world of intransitive legislation-not just elected politicians,
 but increasingly a body of staff who have substantial room to act on
 their own initiative. And it is in part because of a failure to see that
 once the conversion has been made from "transitive" to "intransitive"
 statute-making, the theoretical question requires looking more broadly
 at government-as-a-whole. It becomes then a question about control-
 and that question is not only one about Congress's relation to the agen-
 cies (the question on which he would have us focus), but also about the
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 people's relationship to both Congress and the agencies; and also
 about our relationship to the President, and the President's relation-
 ship to the agencies. This is, if you like, the separation-of-powers ques-
 tion; one needs to account for the President and the courts as well as
 the Congress, and for the impact of change in Congress on how we
 would wish Congress (and our government generally) to be.'
 It may be useful to begin with a concrete example of the change to
 which Professor Rubin calls our attention. His examples, understand-
 ably enough in terms of his own career, are drawn from banking regula-
 tion; perhaps a more fully developed example from another area of law
 will illustrate the principal observation on which his paper is based.
 The example will also develop background for later development of
 questions about the completeness of his analysis and suggestions for its
 further development.
 Railroads constituted a major source of social cost in late 19th cen-
 tury America, as well as a major element in the economy.2 The failure
 of the railroads to purchase effective and available safety technology for
 their locomotives and freight cars and to implement standards of com-
 patibility among them had contributed substantially to a staggeringly
 hazardous industrial setting: over twenty thousand workers were being
 injured annually, and over two thousand killed, in accidents that were
 largely avoidable. The common law contributed little impetus to
 changing these results; "assumption of the risk," "contributory negli-
 gence" and the "fellow servant" doctrine impeded workers' lawsuits.
 Even in the absence of these elements a railroad would not be found to
 have been negligent for providing equipment less safe than it might be,
 if it had provided its workers with the equipment in common use at the
 time. The hazards of the workplace, as it ordinarily was, provided the
 ground against which possible common-law liability was to be assessed.
 Congress enacted the Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of
 1.
 In this century, the nexus of policy making has largely shifted from the consti-
 tutionally designated branches of government to the bureaucracy: the system
 of shared powers created by the Constitution has become a system of shared
 influence over bureaucratic decision making. Each branch of government pos-
 sesses many tools with which to influence the bureaucracy; both Congress and
 the president attempt to design institutional arrangements to effectively over-
 see and control bureaucratic decision making. These institutional arrange-
 ments channel and constrain policy making within the bureaucracy.
 Congress: Structure and Policy 403 (M. McCubbins & T. Sullivan eds. 1987).
 2. The two paragraphs following draw on materials concerning the development
 and implementation of the Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 531
 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. ?? 1-43 (1982)), collected in P. Strauss, Materials for
 a Course in Legal Methods 106-248 (prov. ed. 1988). See, in particular, Kohn v. Mc-
 Nulta, 147 U.S. 238 (1893); H. Rep. No. 1678, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892); 24 Cong.
 Rec. 1246-51, 1273-88, 1323-33, 1370-76, 1416-18 (1893); L. Friedman, A History of
 American Law 482-84 (2d ed. 1985).
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 18933 with the avowed purpose of forcing use of the new and safer
 technologies. Although, atypically for its time, the statute delegated
 limited functions to an administrative agency (the Interstate Commerce
 Commission), it was predominantly "transitive" in character. It told
 the railroads just what technologies they were to employ (power brakes,
 automatic couplers, "grab bars," and coupling equipment whose height
 would not vary from standard whether the cars were loaded or empty),
 and declared the sanctions that were to apply in the event of failure.
 While the ICC was permitted to make certain interim decisions-
 whether to postpone the effective date of a standard, whether to recom-
 mend a prosecution to the Attorney General-Congress generally
 placed enforcement power in the hands of the prosecutors and the
 courts. With a trivial exception,4 no standard remained to be devel-
 oped at a later time or by another authority. One reading the congres-
 sional debates is immediately gripped by a sense, not only of their
 seriousness of purpose and genuineness as debates, but also of their
 sharp focus on precise definition of the appropriate legal response to
 the problem at hand. That was Congress's business.
 By 1966, the automobile had displaced the railroad as mainstay of
 the economy and major source of personal injury. Over fifty thousand
 Americans were dying annually in automobile accidents, with enormous
 additional losses in bodily injury and property damage.5 It was coming
 to be widely believed that a substantial proportion of this carnage could
 be avoided if only the automobile were as well equipped for safety in
 collisions as it was for stylish appearance. Some suitable technologies,
 like the seat belt, were available; others, it was confidently thought,
 could quickly and easily be designed. Few consumers were ordering
 such optional safety technologies as were available, and the automobile
 manufacturers were expending little effort to develop new ones. Again,
 the common law provided little in the way of incentive; in the fifty years
 since the decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 automobile manu-
 facturers had come to accept that they would be held to produce cars
 that were free of defects and reasonably fit for their intended use as
 3. 27 Stat. 531 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. ?? 1-43 (1982)).
 4. The American Railway Association was given 90 days to reach an agreement
 among its members setting the uniform height of the diawbars, and the Commission was
 instructed to set the height if it failed to do so. Id. ? 5 (current version at 45 U.S.C. ? 5
 (1982)).
 5. The two paragraphs following also draw on Strauss, supra note 2, at 503-727,
 which discusses the development and implementation of the National Traffic and Motor
 Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15
 U.S.C. ?? 1381-1431 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The interested reader should watch for
 publication ofJ. Mashaw & D. Harfst, The Freedom Machine (forthcoming by Harvard
 University Press), which tells the story of this legislation, in Congress and out, in its
 rather unpleasant detail; a version has appeared as Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and
 Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 257 (1987).
 6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1051 (1916).
 1989]  429
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.30 on Thu, 28 Apr 2016 19:56:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
 automobiles; but they were not held to foresee that their products
 would be involved in collisions, and thus the law was indifferent to their
 failures to design their products for safe performance in the event of an
 accident.7
 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,8 like
 the Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893, sought to force the develop-
 ment and deployment of safety technology. Congress was not prepared
 to decide, however, what measures should be taken to render cars ac-
 ceptably safe. It gave authority to an agency within the Department of
 Commerce (soon to be transferred to the Department of Transporta-
 tion) to decide, following rather elaborately stated procedures, what
 safety standards would be "reasonable, practicable and appropriate for
 the particular type of motor vehicle . . . for which it is prescribed,"
 would "meet the need for motor vehicle safety" and could "be stated in
 objective terms."9
 The contrast with the "transitive" Safety Appliances Act is striking.
 The 1966 Congress, in the same legislative breath, decided far less for
 itself and required its agency delegate to exercise much more detailed
 choice and supervision over the automobile industry than the 1893
 Congress had done concerning the railroads. And one reading the leg-
 islative history finds similar contrasts. The 1966 legislative process dif-
 fered profoundly from that of 1893, both for institutional reasons and
 in view of the changed nature of the legislative product. Used to leav-
 ing matters to its own growing bureaucracy and that of executive gov-
 ernment, and consumed with the demands of overseeing both, the
 1966 Congress had neither time nor inclination to attend to legislative
 detail; there was no debate worthy of the name, just rhetoric about the
 seriousness of the problem and the need, at last, to see that something
 was done about it. This is, then, an excellent example of an "intransi-
 tive" statute.
 I. CONGRESSIONAL SIZE AS AN ADDED ELEMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION
 Our understanding of the change would be considerably enriched,
 and our perspective perhaps shifted, if we were to look as hard at
 changes in Congress the institution as at changes in its work-product.
 Professor Rubin indeed notes that the changes in legislative work-
 7.
 The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in
 collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the
 possibility .... [T]he defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven
 into bodies of water, but it is not suggested that defendant has a duty to equip
 them with pontoons.
 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966).
 8. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
 ?? 1381-1431 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
 9. 15 U.S.C. ?? 1392(f)(3), 1391(2), 1392(a).
 430  [Vol. 89:427
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.30 on Thu, 28 Apr 2016 19:56:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COIMMENTS ON RUBIN
 product-intransitive rather than transitive statutes-may be owing not
 only to changes in the nature of the problems having to be solved (their
 added complexity and the like), but also to changes in the institution
 producing them, Congress itself.10 Yet he does not ask whether the
 latter changes give rise to difficulties of their own. He describes as "re-
 forms" such alterations as "the increase in professional staff, the modi-
 fication of the seniority system and the creation of congressional
 agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office."" In my judgment,
 the "reform" characterization is not obvious; we need fuller analysis of
 these changes before reaching prescriptive conclusions. Considering
 political controls exercised by Congress as part of a new theory of in-
 transitive legislation will require us to consider who will be exercising
 those controls, in what circumstances, subject themselves to what over-
 sight, and with what if any necessary connection to the views (various as
 they will be in the usual situation) that underlay the legislation as a
 whole.
 One of the differences between the Congress of the transitive late-
 19th century and the Congress of the intransitive present is the simple
 fact of size. The Congress of that era had little in the way of profes-
 sional staff;'2 its members dealt with one another, and one may imagine
 that that had a good deal to do with the transitivity of its output. The
 debates over the Safety Appliances Act were debates among individuals
 who had themselves studied the problem and come to conclusions, and
 who were, transparently, reasoning with one another about the precise
 shape of a desirable outcome. The Congress of today is a bureaucracy
 of over twenty thousand'3-many in agencies such as the Congres-
 sional Budget Office or the General Accounting Office of Bowsher v.
 Synar 4 fame, but thousands also in the offices of individual members
 or on the staffs of congressional committees. The change reflects a dra-
 matic alteration in the nature and possibilities of legislative function.
 While "[h]aving a substantial number of staff people with appropriate
 investigative authority seems a necessary condition for congressional
 oversight of the executive branch and the independent regulatory com-
 missions," writes M. Malbin, "there is a gloomier side: the effect of
 staffs on Congress's ability to act as a deliberative body."'5 Use of staff
 marginalizes debate and discussion among elected representatives and
 10. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 369,
 396 (1989).
 11. Id.
 12. Polsby, The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 Am.
 Pol. Sci. Rev. 144, 158-60 (1968), reprinted in Congress: Structure and Policy, supra
 note 1, at 91.
 13. See infra note 16.
 14. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
 15. M. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of
 Representative Government 240 (1980).
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 introduces serious problems in information management and assess-
 ment. Nor has the use of staff
 left the members with more time to concentrate on their legis-
 lative work. . . . [W]hile representatives as recently as 1965
 spent almost one full day every week on legislative research
 and reading, by 1977 the time spent on reading was down to
 an average of eleven minutes per day. In other words, instead
 of freeing the members to concentrate, the staffs contribute to
 the frenetic pace of congressional life that pulls members in
 different directions, reduces the time available for joint delib-
 eration, and makes concentration all but impossible.... The
 situation feeds on itself. The members need staff because they
 have so little time to concentrate, but the new work created by
 the staff takes even more of the members' time, indirectly ele-
 vating the power of Washington issue networks in which the
 staffs play so prominent a role.16
 One must immediately concede that "the curse of bigness" is
 hardly a problem for the Congress alone,17 and that it may be hard to
 pin down propositions about cause and effect. Consider the following
 possible accounts, which need not be taken as mutually exclusive. The
 first is that the growth is the result of technological developments-as
 simple as the availability of the jet plane and the evening television
 news, and what they connote for congressional behavior: more fre-
 quent trips home; more visitors at the office; more emphasis on expo-
 16. Id. at 242-44. A more recent assessment is no different:
 In 1974, there were 16,000 people on House and Senate staffs at a cost of $328
 million. Today, there are 20,000 at a cost of a shade less than $1 billion....
 Why has Congress grown so much? Not because this is a bigger country. Since
 1970, the population has increased by 7 percent; Congressional staffs have in-
 creased 43 percent. Not because the issues are more complex; they have always
 been complex.
 The fundamental reasons are the members' desire to make a mark, to get pub-
 licity and the need to raise campaign funds.
 M. Gwirtzman, Far Too Many People on Capitol Hill, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1988, at A31,
 col. 3. Mr. Gwirtzman notes that at last count there were more than 250 separate sub-
 committees-12 on the subject of international economics alone-and that "the present
 average of 60 various hearings a day means some members are scheduled into three or
 four at once, in addition to their other work." Id.
 17. Respecting the Executive Branch see, e.g., H. Merry, Five-Branch Government:
 The Full Measure of Constitutional Checks and Balances (1980); D. Price, America's
 Unwritten Constitution: Science, Religion, and Political Responsibility (1983); B. Pat-
 terson, The Ring of Power: The White House Staff and its Expanding Role in Govern-
 ment (1988). Respecting the judiciary, see, e.g., R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis
 and Reform (1985); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of
 the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987). In addition, a Conference on the Presidency and the Press,
 at Columbia University School of Law (Jan. 18, 1989), heard Hugh Sidey of Time Maga-
 zine ascribe much (unfavorable) change in the character of White House-press relations
 to the growth of the White House press corps from a knowable few dozen to a wolf-pack
 of 1400.
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 sure to voters and personal celebrity rather than old-fashioned party
 politics as the basis for a career. The second and related account, given
 by public choice theorists, is that the behavior of members of Congress
 is fundamentally to be understood in terms of the drive for reelection-
 reelection to be secured by increasing personal opportunities for
 credit-taking (general, intransitive legislation of the do-something-
 about-this-problem type, or private casework for constituents) and
 avoiding public resolution of difficult issues (transitive legislation).
 Third (a competing political science vision), one could argue that state
 actors wield (and hence seek to enlarge) power quite independent of
 the electorate, an activity more likely to be successful if they have a
 loyal apparatus to assist and if there exist opportunities for private, per-
 sonal action than if they must act in a setting requiring public collabo-
 ration with others;18 thus, the internal congressional reforms of the
 early 1970s-the replacement of powerful committee chairmen operat-
 ing under seniority rules with much more dispersed authority struc-
 tures-added to the need for staff and provided many more
 opportunities for the exercise of essentially private power. A fourth,
 and related, account would be that Congress's incentives and need for
 staff have been influenced, if not distorted, by two decades, almost un-
 interrupted, of Republican Presidents and Democratic Congresses; the
 truly massive growth in congressional staff of the early 1970s occurred
 at the time of the budget and impoundment struggles between the Re-
 publican (Nixon) White House and Democratic Congress, which re-
 sulted in creation of the Congressional Budget Office and a massive
 supplementary congressional budget operation.
 Whichever of these explanations we choose to accept, or perhaps
 others that could be imagined, we are left with the fact of a swollen staff
 apparatus and, accordingly, significant issues of control. In effect, con-
 gressional process has itself become intransitive-members put more
 effort into control and less into specification-and it has also become
 fragmented and depersonalized. These changes, too, need to be con-
 sidered in moving from a description of the need for a new theory to an
 effort at formulation. They provide, if you like, possible reasons for an
 "attitude of distrust about the modern legislative process"19 that are
 quite contemporary and not at all linked to sentimental attachments to
 the old. While it has always been hazardous to speak anthropomorphi-
 cally of a legislature, as if it were a unified body capable of memory and
 intention, those difficulties are compounded when personnel prolifer-
 ate, responsibilities are spread, and concerted action is abandoned in
 favor of individualized or even committee oversight. "The hazard is
 that a body like Congress, when it gets into detail, ceases to be itself; it
 18. E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (1981).
 19. Rubin, supra note 10, at 387.
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 acts through a fraction which may be a faction."20
 Indeed, the enlargement of congressional staff could be seen as
 contributing to the specificity of legislation, albeit a specificity that may
 heighten factional dangers, as Congress struggles with the President
 for political control of government. It has been frequently enough re-
 marked that the statutes of the health and safety regulatory outpouring
 of the 1960s and early 1970s were quite a bit more, not less, specific
 than the economic regulatory statutes of the 1930s. Thus the 1977
 amendments of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, reacting to appar-
 ent failures of administrative (executive) action, indicated in some de-
 tail the pollutants to be regulated and the deadlines to be met in doing
 so.21 The 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act refer to a
 table of contaminants the agency had published in the Federal Register
 as part of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, requiring the
 agency to act on those contaminants within stated times and permitting
 only limited substitutions.22 After skimming the public laws enacted by
 the first session of the 100th Congress-not a recommended activity-I
 can report that virtually all laws enacted by that Congress were intransi-
 tive in Professor Rubin's sense; they assigned chores to one or another
 Secretary or Commission. Yet scattered through their pages were pro-
 visions of striking specificity. Section 202(e) of the Water Quality Act
 of 1987, a statute running 84 pages in Statutes at Large, provides that
 "[t]he activated bio-filter feature of the project for treatment works of
 the city of Little Falls, Minnesota, shall be deemed to be an innovative
 wastewater process and technique for purposes of" federal grant sup-
 port.23 Without that provision, whether to qualify the bio-filter feature
 would have been a matter for administrative detail. Similarly, the
 twenty-three page National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of
 1987 sets maximum permissible energy consumption levels for a vari-
 ety of household appliances;24 and the 130-page Surface Transporta-
 tion and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 specifies the rush
 hour restrictions for a suburban Washington, D.C. highway.25 Perhaps
 especially striking in its implications for the contemporary uses of con-
 gressional staff is section 415(a) of the Competitive Equality Banking
 Act of 1987, which provides that the Senate and House Banking Com-
 mittees are each to "monitor and review" the informal review proceed-
 ings of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board when bank examiners'
 20. Macmahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the
 Purse (pt. 2), 58 Pol. Sci. Q. 380, 414 (1943).
 21. See the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. ?? 7409(c), 741 (f)(1) (1982) (specifying time-
 tables and pollutant); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. ? 131 l(b)(2)(c) (1982) (specifying
 pollutants and time for action).
 22. 42 U.S.C. ? 300g-l(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
 23. Pub. L. No. 100-4, ? 202(e), 101 Stat. 7, 16 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. ? 1282).
 24. Pub. L. No. 100-12, ? 325(a)-(i), 101 Stat. 103, 108-13 (to be codified at 42
 U.S.C. ? 6295).
 25. Pub. L. No. 100-17, ? 147, 101 Stat. 132, 180-81.
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 decisions about appraising or classifying savings bank loans are called
 into question there.26
 If this is a return toward transitivity, it is a return in a special sense,
 made possible only by the enormous growth in congressional staff and
 armed by politics. One need not see this as irresponsible; the staff have
 bosses, and it is in their interest to find out what will satisfy those
 bosses and then to bring about that state of affairs.27 Yet it is also hard
 to pretend that such matters reflect judgments of any members of Con-
 gress outside the responsible committee (or, perhaps, even the judg-
 ments of most within it), and the committee presents the factional
 dangers already described. As between a judgment by that faction,
 loosely responsible to the Congress as a whole, and an agency head
 loosely responsible to the President, a contemporary theory of public
 law free of the problems introduced by Republican presidencies and
 Democratic legislatures might well prefer the latter. Whether the use
 of staff is producing more low-level monitoring or quixotically precise
 statutes, or both, the implications of its presence and behavior require
 us to know a good deal more about the institution before we can decide
 just what we want to do about it.28
 To take one concrete example of a possible outcome of such analy-
 ses, consider the recent reawakening of respectability for arguments
 that statutes ought to be interpreted on the basis of what they say, not
 what their legislative history might appear to reveal. Over the years,
 lawyerly and judicial debate about how best to interpret statutes has
 been a compound of several elements-suspicion about what populist
 legislation might do to the formal unity of the common law; concern to
 suppress judicial subjectivity; doubt about the existence of shared con-
 gressional "intentions" on issues of meaning or, in any event, about the
 possibility of accurately reconstructing them; the conviction that stat-
 utes in a democracy should be taken as a source of law superior to the
 common law; the belief that attention to legislative history would, as an
 exercise, tend to take judges outside themselves and closer to the popu-
 lar will that statutes reflect. If, for a while following the New Deal,
 these debates were moving toward closer consideration of legislative
 materials-to the point even of excluding judges from a tradition of
 being responsible as the general systematizers of law29-the recent sig-
 26. Pub. L. No. 100-86, ? 415(a), 101 Stat. 552, 622 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. ? 1437
 (West Supp. 1988)).
 27. Suppositions about the general effectiveness of such controls are at the root of
 analyses such as Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast, A Theory of Political Control and
 Agency Discretion (1987) (on file at Columbia Law Review).
 28. See Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Con-
 tinuing Resolution, 1988 Duke LJ. 389.
 29. I take this to be the general point of the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in
 United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940). The case has been
 understood for generations as a watershed in statutory interpretation, but simplistically
 described as marking the divide between unthinking "plain meaning" interpretation and
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 nals are that recognition of the changes in congressional process are
 moving the courts in very different directions.30
 Members of Congress, their staffs, and those who try to influence
 them appear to have noticed that congressional reports have their uses,
 not only within Congress, but also after Congress has finished its work.
 It is commonplace that seeing that congressional reports are influential
 upon later events-especially so for intransitive statutes-politicians
 wishing to shape those later events turn their attention to shaping the
 congressional reports. Any reader of contemporary committee reports
 must be struck by the frequency with which remarks such as "the Com-
 mittee intends" are to be found.31 And any realistic reader under-
 stands that these remarks are ordinarily written by staff, often at the
 behest of lobbyists, not by the members of Congress themselves.
 Moreover, as prior discussion suggests, the proposition that reports are
 read, rather than prepared for their possible impact upon later events,
 is increasingly an amiable fiction-at least if the reader is supposed to
 be the harried Senator, the person who actually casts a vote. The Sena-
 tor has time only for a hasty conversation with an aide, who has no time
 to explain details.
 Does it then make sense to rely upon reports as significant indica-
 tors of the meaning of the legislation to which they refer? National
 Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board32 is an
 interpretation willing to attend the signals of congressional understanding to be found
 in the legislative history. One seeing that the majority had among them barely ten years
 of experience on the Court, and that the minority included in their number ChiefJustice
 Hughes and Justice Stone, might think that the decisive proposition had more to do with
 the distinctive issues of the New Deal. Stone, in particular, was-for his time-among
 the strongest proponents of thoughtful statutory interpretation and the superior claim
 of Congress, but he married that position to an understanding that the judge's role was
 that of melding statute and case law into a unified whole. Stone, The Common Law in
 the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-16 (1936). It is that strong judicial role that
 the New Deal characteristically distrusted and the American Trucking majority rejected, in
 favor of a view that treated statutes as referenced to historical congressional understand-
 ings alone.
 It is not hard to find in recent discussions of statutory interpretation-for example,
 in Aleinikoff's contrast between "archaeological" and "nautical" styles of interpretation,
 Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 21 (1988)-a
 reawakening of that debate.
 30. Perhaps the Republican-Democratic division between the White House and
 Capitol Hill also plays a role here. While the Reagan administration was enthusiastic for
 "original intent" in the constitutional context, one's impression is that its judges,
 Republicans, have been leading the charge away from reliance on legislative history-
 that is to say, Democratic history. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi.
 L. Rev. 533, 544-52 (1983); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1026
 (1989); Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke L.J. 371,
 377, 379; K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (opinions of Kennedy
 and Scalia, JJ.).
 31. E.g., S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, 9, 13-15, reprinted in 1966
 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709, 2714-15, 2717, 2720-23.
 32. 618 F.2d 819, 827-28, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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 early example of a modern court troubled by this issue. The case in-
 volved the question whether a recently enacted statute permitted the
 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to exempt air cargo carriers from cer-
 tain regulatory requirements. Statutory language strongly suggested
 that it did. The only explanation of that language appeared in a confer-
 ence report, which said that "the Managers [of the conference report]
 do not contemplate that the Board will exempt carriers from the re-
 quirement ...." 33 The D.C. Circuit put this legislative history aside in
 the face of statutory language that it thought clearly authorized the
 CAB's action. Its refusal to rely on the conference report struck a
 broader note of skepticism about the uses and abuses of legislative his-
 tory. "Courts in the past," the court observed,
 have been able to rely on legislative history for important in-
 sights into congressional intent. Without implying that this is
 no longer the case, we note that interest groups who fail to
 persuade a majority of the Congress to accept particular statu-
 tory language often are able to have inserted in the legislative
 history of the statute statements favorable to their position, in
 the hope that they can persuade a court to construe the statu-
 tory language in light of these statements. This development
 underscores the importance of following unambiguous statu-
 tory language absent clear contrary evidence of legislative
 intent.34
 A different but equally important response to the problems pro-
 duced by the size of the congressional enterprise as well as its intransi-
 tivity is found in the increasing willingness of the courts to acknowledge
 that statutory texts lack fully determinate meaning. Perhaps especially
 noteworthy is the following passage from Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
 sources Defense Council:35
 In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a
 reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
 and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is techni-
 cal and complex, the agency considered the matter in a de-
 tailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
 reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to accom-
 modate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of
 specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously
 desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that
 those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administer-
 ing the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply
 did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was
 unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on
 33. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 773, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
 Code Cong. & Admin. News 3396, 3399-400.
 34. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, 618 F.2d at 828; accord TVA v. Hill,
 437 U.S. 153, 172-73, 184-93 (1978); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir.
 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
 35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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 each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
 agency.36
 The scenarios described (along with some others) are just those that
 explain much legislative intransitivity.
 The proposition about "tak[ing] their chances with the scheme de-
 vised by the agency" ought to caution against any universal rejection of
 the worth of committee reports or other artifacts of legislative history
 in the world of the intransitive statute and the swollen staff. Legislative
 history speaks to the agency much more loudly than it does to the
 court, which does not have to undergo continuing relationships of
 oversight and budgetary dependency. A number of reasons may exist
 for encouraging (or at least accepting as inevitable) its use at the agency
 level. Courts have long recognized the "contemporaneous construc-
 tion[s]" of statutes by those appointed to administer them as powerful
 indicators of statutory meaning.37 They have done so, in substantial
 part, because of the agency's fuller and more accurate political sense of
 the situation. Under intransitive statutes, for which the first reading of
 a statute typically will not be a court's, one might think it better that this
 political good sense be derived from signals sent in public-that is,
 from committee reports however written-than from signals more pri-
 vately conveyed.38 The agency, if a participant in the drafting, may well
 have tools to distinguish false from valid signals of full congressional
 politics that a court would lack.
 Any propositions about subsequent political controls by the legisla-
 ture ought to give the most careful attention to the questions earlier
 raised. The farther one moves from enactment, the harder it is to pre-
 tend either that Congress held an (inexplicit) view that the agency
 could sense, or that the particular committee, member of Congress or
 staffer communicating with an agency represents that view. For while
 individual members responsible for oversight may have views on one or
 more of the issues left open, the body did not; and the disjunction will
 only get larger as the years go on and as oversight is exercised or struc-
 tured by persons other than those entitled to vote on the floor.
 One can make this point in a theoretical way connected with Pro-
 fessor Rubin's discussion of the principal/agent problem. He proceeds
 as if there were only one such problem-that between Congress and its
 agent, the agency. In fact, there are two principal/agent problems im-
 mediately at work, and others in the wings. Congress is also an agent of
 the citizens; it is neither our only agent, nor our only agent in what
 could be called a principal/agent relationship with the agencies. When
 Rubin remarks that "the legislature may be better able to control an
 36. Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
 37. E.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
 (1933).
 38. One cannot doubt that, for the reasons Professor Rubin describes, the signals
 will be sent. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 394.
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 administrative agency than to control itself,"39 he ought more properly
 to say that Congress may be better able to control an administrative
 agency than we can control Congress, and that suggests some addi-
 tional difficulties to which a new theory of legislation must respond.
 Indeed, putting the problem this way highlights both that Congress is
 not our (the citizens') only agent, and that it is our agent for limited
 purposes. That conclusion ought to underscore earlier observations
 about presidential-congressional competition and sharply raise separa-
 tion-of-powers issues. We ought not be talking only about the
 Congress.
 II. THE PROPER FIELD OF DESCRIPTION
 Professor Rubin's basic point might be restated as follows: our ex-
 isting body of legislative theory, in assuming that legislatures will (and
 should) act transitively, focuses on issues of specification-has the leg-
 islature been sufficiently precise? Has it permitted others to reach con-
 clusions that ought to be made only by it? Once we admit that a
 legislature may act intransitively-we can no longer hope to deny that
 it may-tests of specificity lose their point; the issue on which theory
 must now focus is that of control.
 This analysis is persuasive. While I shall suggest later on that "del-
 egation" and "void-for-vagueness" may have their continuing uses if
 viewed from a slightly different angle, the observation that they are pre-
 mised in the idea of legislation as transitive in character is apt. Yet the
 proposition that we ought now to be generating a legislative theory
 premised on ideas of control might be thought to carry with it a change
 in analytic and normative perspective for which Professor Rubin does
 not account. Once control becomes the focal issue of theory, we notice
 that the legislature is not the only part of government controlling; the
 courts control and, within the more political realm, the President also
 controls.40 The growth of the administrative state has not been a func-
 tion only of change in legislative function; as government has swelled
 and its tasks proliferated, executive arrangements and our expectations
 about them have changed as well; and so have the relations between
 agencies and courts.
 Surely it is enough, the reader may respond, to attend to the
 changes on the legislative side. And for detailed attention, that may be
 conceded. Yet any legislative theory we may have is necessarily to be
 caught up in a more general theory of government-the more so given
 the totemic quality of separation-of-powers considerations in the Amer-
 39. Id.
 40. More properly, the Presidency controls. Here, as with the Congress, interac-
 tions are managed by a bureaucracy itself under imperfect control, not by the President
 himself. See, e.g., National Academy of Pub. Admin., Presidential Management of
 Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (an. 1987); B. Patterson, supra note 17.
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 ican context. Granted the importance of controlling agencies that have
 been given important social responsibilities under intransitive statutory
 instructions, that proposition only opens the question to what extent
 that control should occur through the open, event-focused, and some-
 what rationalistic techniques characteristic of the courts, and to what
 extent through political processes. And then, if one decides that some
 ongoing political controls are essential, as inevitably one would, the
 further question arises how they ought to be distributed between Presi-
 dent and Congress. That question requires some attention to the prob-
 lem whether different executive and legislative roles can profitably be
 imagined in an era when the top layers of government are characterized
 more by control than performance;41 and to how particular "control"
 functions that might be envisioned for the legislature-say, the legisla-
 tive veto-might affect its continuing performance of function, or its
 relation with the President. These questions Professor Rubin elides;
 yet they bear importantly on some aspects of his analysis.
 To make the point concrete, consider the Supreme Court's recent
 decision in Morrison v. Olson,42 the Independent Counsel litigation. The
 case concerned a challenge, on separation-of-powers grounds, to an
 "intransitive" statute enabling the appointment of prosecuting officials
 more than usually independent of presidential direction. These officers
 and such executive branch control processes over them as were permit-
 ted are also subject to greater than usual (but not much) congressional
 oversight. The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, next to unani-
 mous, upheld the statute on the basis of an analysis far less formalistic
 than that which had characterized the decisions in Chadha and Bowsher.
 I imagine that Professor Rubin would think, as I do, that on this occa-
 sion the Court produced a correspondingly more satisfying analysis.
 What ought to be noted, however, is that the analysis was not one
 that gave up the game of distinguishing between President and Con-
 gress or that failed to recognize that some choices about political con-
 trols denied the President or reserved to the Congress produce
 constitutional difficulty. The analytic questions for the Court included
 such issues as whether the President's controls over special prosecu-
 tors, although diminished, remained sufficient to preserve (and avoid
 impermissible interference with) the characteristic functions of his (the
 President's) office;43 whether the controls Congress had reserved for
 itself were such as to exceed the characteristic functions of the legisla-
 41. It is important to this line of reasoning to distinguish sharply between the Presi-
 dent and the ordinary agencies of government, and note that, in the arena of domestic
 regulation at least, the functions of the presidency also have become intransitive. His is
 an office that guides, shapes, and controls; but decision and implementation, as with
 Congress, are placed in the agencies themselves, not in his hands. See Strauss, The
 Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 587-95 (1984); supra note 40
 42. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
 43. Id. at 2621-22.
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 ture;44 and whether the result as a whole reflected an attempt by Con-
 gress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive
 Branch.45 That Congress might exercise political controls and attempt
 to separate administration from executive politics to some extent was
 not denied; but such political controls as Congress might exercise had
 to be assessed in the context of a continuing distinction between execu-
 tive and legislative activity, and in light of their impact on the Presi-
 dent's characteristic role.
 The presidency is missing from Professor Rubin's paper, and its
 absence saps the force of the prescriptive analysis. A theory of legisla-
 tion addressed to the problems of intransitivity ought to recognize the
 existence and role of the President as our most powerful political actor,
 both entitled to exercise his own characteristic oversight roles and pro-
 tected from undue interference in those roles (or confusion about who
 is playing them). Granted that intransitivity gives added dimension to
 the problem of continuing political control, reasons of both constitu-
 tional and practical dimension may suggest placing some such controls
 in the President's hands rather than the Congress's, or counsel at least
 that some rough parity, some principle of nonexclusion, be observed
 between them. That the President will be playing suggests, too, an ad-
 ditional element to the congressional dynamic-especially in these
 times of split political responsibility for government; in creating an in-
 transitive regime, Congress delivers substantial control to the President
 and thus raises for itself the problem how it can disarm the lobbyists
 who may be successful over there in defeating its own policy
 preferences.46
 III. A REASSESSMENT OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CRITIQUE
 Professor Rubin's observation that the delegation and void-for-
 vagueness doctrines are rather beside the point as constraints for a
 Congress producing intransitive legislation provides useful insight.
 While one could cavil with the argument in some respects,47 its conclu-
 sions are persuasive. It does not follow, however, that these ideas are
 without continuing utility in the present era. Consideration of how
 44. Id. at 2620-21.
 45. Id.
 46. See, e.g., text following supra note 20.
 47. Thus, the discussion at the theoretical level becomes more difficult once one
 acknowledges that Congress is not the source of legislative authority but its recipient-
 that the original "delegation" of legislative authority occurs in the Constitution, from
 the people to Congress. Drawing on the very understandings about general agency law
 that Professor Rubin cites, supra note 10, at 389 n.66, John Locke argued, influentially
 so far as the drafters of the Constitution were concerned, that such grants from the
 people of legislative power were ones "only to make laws, and not to make legislators."
 J. Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government ? 141. That principle is, nonetheless,
 one that "has fallen before the inexorable momentum of the administrative state."
 Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1983).
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 these doctrines might operate as part of the necessary network of polit-
 ical and legal controls constraining agency activity might have suggested
 that the ideas remain vital and helpful.
 Regarding delegation, it may be useful to start with Professor
 Rubin's observations that "the passage of legislation and the conse-
 quent authorization of a federal implementation mechanism is not only
 an initial exercise of legislative power, but a framework in which that
 power continues to be exercised,"48, and that as a matter of general
 constitutional principle, "all organs of government should be con-
 strained by rules, and . . . their obedience to those rules should be su-
 pervised by some formal or informal method."49 These observations,
 powerful as they are, open a series of questions to which the idea of
 delegation has some relevance. They suggest that the quality of even
 an intransitive statute as "framework" has significance, and that it
 would be appropriate to focus attention on the behavior of the agency
 as delegate to determine what does, and does not, serve to constrain.
 Taken in conjunction, they suggest the appropriateness of considering
 also the impact on Congress-an organ of government-of various
 constraints on its behavior during the post-statutory period during
 which "power continues to be exercised."
 Thus, a different way to assess the failures or successes of the dele-
 gation doctrine might be to look at the behavior of government agen-
 cies in formulating and defending their work-product. Thousands of
 government attorneys spend much of their time demonstrating in inter-
 nal memoranda, and when relevant in opinions, rulemakings, and judi-
 cial briefs, the bases on which proposed official action can be thought
 authorized (or not) by governing statutes. While these conclusions may
 be given dispositive weight when statutes are acknowledged themselves
 to provide no sharp resolution of the question raised,50 the structure of
 the argument, the behavior of formal justification, is itself important.
 Government attorneys do not think it relevant ("safe" is perhaps a bet-
 ter term) to argue that, since a statute was imprecise or broadly
 worded, the agency may do anything it pleases, or that a court or other
 outside observer cannot competently tell whether it is or is not acting
 within authority. They acknowledge the obligation to demonstrate au-
 thority-and with it, all the other issues about regularity that follow,
 such as consistency with (or an explanation of departure from) prior
 results, procedural correctness and the appropriate exercise of
 judgment.
 The delegation doctrine thus provides the impetus for agency con-
 cessions that the exercise of certain forms of discretion is subject to
 review for "abuse." Even if we must acknowledge at the outset that the
 48. Rubin, supra note 10, at 392.
 49. Id. at 392 n.75.
 50. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
 (1984).
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 agency will often succeed in justifying its conduct, precisely because the
 statutory formula is diffuse (very often deliberately) and agency discre-
 tion correspondingly large, the stance won-that the agency must be
 prepared to justify its behavior to outside assessors in accordance with
 principles of regularity and legality-is no trivial matter.51 The very
 fact of confidence in the possibility of supervision, and the winning of
 behavior from government that acknowledges its appropriateness and
 inevitability, lies at the heart of a commitment to the rule of law. This
 sense of delegation, which Professor Rubin identifies as constitutional
 in character,52 remains vital; that, it is not difficult to say, is what under-
 lies the persistence of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.53 The
 regularity and accessibility that a government must promise in order to
 remain "under law" were missing in that case; the government's behav-
 ior,54 Congress's generosity and the temper of the times conjoined to
 rob the Court of the assurance it must ultimately have that it would be
 able to say whether discretion conferred by law, but having to remain
 subject to check, had been abused.
 One might then ask whether this rule of law idea of delegation,
 diffuse and difficult as it may be, provides any appropriate constraints
 over Congress. Direct control over the necessary specificity of legisla-
 tive action is not the only possibility in this regard. One can imagine,
 also, constraints whose tendency might be thought to induce Congress
 to make as many choices in advance as reasonably possible, or to re-
 duce the chance of undesirable (because private, or distorting of public
 agendas, or the like) "controls" exercised after initial establishment of
 the legislative framework. To acknowledge that statutes may be intran-
 sitive, providing a framework for continuing interaction rather than a
 present resolution of policy issues, ought to heighten concern over just
 what the postenactment behaviors of members of Congress might be
 and how the possibility of their continuing control might feed back on
 51. For this reason, Professor Rubin appears to move too quickly from the proposi-
 tion that courts no longer enjoy full interpretive control over statutory content, empha-
 sized by the decision in Chevron, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, to the
 conclusion that they are "out of the loop." Rubin, supra note 10, at 396. The remain-
 ing judicial functions of boundary definition and regularity assurance, which he fairly
 identifies, are significant and important ones; the governmental behaviors that facilitate
 their exercise, as already suggested, seem the direct product of the "rule of law" aspect
 of delegation.
 52. Rubin, supra note 10, at 392 n.75.
 53. 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (striking down code-making provisions of the Na-
 tional Industrial Recovery Act as an "unconstitutional delegation of legislative power").
 54. Compare Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), the other New Deal
 delegation case, in which the government was compelled to acknowledge at oral argu-
 ment that the standard at issue not only was never published, but, through a drafting
 error, had in fact been vitiated-although it had still been relied on in the case. See
 Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 571 (1947);
 Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev.
 645, 658-60 (1946).
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 the legislative process or disturb our general hopes for regularity in
 government.
 While Professor Rubin writes warmly of congressional oversight,
 he does not yet seem to have addressed himself concertedly to these
 issues. He limits the normative aspect of delegation as a "continuing
 constraint on the legislature itself"55 to its (outmoded) push toward
 transitive legislative outcomes. He does not consider its tendency to
 enforce the general allocations of responsibility suggested by separa-
 tion-of-powers theory, to enhance openness in the exercise of govern-
 mental authority, or to control the supplanting of formal congressional
 action by the "fraction which may be a faction."56 Will oversight occur
 as the result of efforts of individuals or strategically placed small
 groups? It is then hard to ascribe to that oversight the political quali-
 ties of action by the legislature itself; the observation that "the legisla-
 ture may be better able to control an administrative agency than to
 control itself"57 is, in this respect, dangerously anthropomorphic.
 Moreover, the easier it becomes for Congress, or persons in some
 sense acting for it, to control agency behavior by other-than-legislative
 means, the less incentive there is to precision in initial drafting. Even
 conceding, as one must, that substantial intransitivity is inescapable in
 the modern context, one may regard with suspicion approaches that
 promise diminished congressional attention to its primary, public, leg-
 islative function in favor of other functions likely to prove both less
 public and less responsible. The public-choice literature Professor
 Rubin briefly discusses underscores these concerns, which will perhaps
 become more accessible below where they are addressed in the specific
 context of the legislative veto.58
 Similarly, one wishes Professor Rubin had looked beyond direct
 application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to statutes, to the possi-
 bility of systemic application. He convincingly shows us that for intran-
 sitive statutes in themselves, the void-for-vagueness idea (which he takes
 to represent Professor Lon Fuller's principles of morality in law) has
 little utility. But Fuller formulated his principles, as Professor Rubin
 recognizes, for "a system for subjecting human conduct to the govern-
 ance of rules,"59 and that suggests that their utility is not to be assessed
 by looking at the legislative output alone. Professor Rubin's assertion
 that "[w]hen [a] statute is enforced by an agency, our normative system
 simply does not make the demands that Fuller perceives"60 is correct
 only with regard to the statute as subject, not with regard to the
 broader system of which it is a part.
 55. Rubin, supra note 10, at 393.
 56. See MacMahon, supra note 20, at 414.
 57. Rubin, supra note 10, at 394.
 58. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
 59. Rubin, supra note 10, at 398 (emphasis added).
 60. Id. at 399.
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 Thus, vagueness or a lack of clarity in modern legislation is toler-
 ated because it exists within a system that does give legal obligations or
 restrictions more precise shape before the citizen is asked to act or sub-
 jected to penalties for unwanted behavior. The agency's development
 and enunciation of administrative policy serves, in this respect, pre-
 cisely the same function as does a judicial "narrowing construction" in
 conventional void-for-vagueness jurisprudence; it provides the requi-
 site clarity and assurance of acceptable stability in results. Seen as an
 obligation applicable to the system, embracing agency and Congress
 together, the other elements of Fuller's analysis seem equally apt. In
 using the term "law," he was not limiting himself to statutes; while it is
 apt to say that he probably did not have the world of public administra-
 tion in mind, he sought to describe the morality of a system, not its
 particular elements. What Professor Rubin has done, then, is to indi-
 cate that the statute in isolation is not the appropriate focus of the
 Fuller analysis; but he has not shown that analysis to be inappropriate
 for the system as a whole.
 Again, in formulating a theory of legislation that accepts as a start-
 ing point the appropriateness of substantial intransitivity by the
 originating legislature, what one hopes to see is an account that consid-
 ers the functioning of the system as a whole-that considers how par-
 ticular approaches to the possible styles and varieties of legislative
 action (here including postenactment oversight in all its forms) are
 likely to contribute to or detract from both Congress's general per-
 formance of function in the constitutional framework we have and the
 acceptability of that system's output as "law." To the extent Professor
 Rubin's purpose is descriptive, to show that our present tools for con-
 trolling legislative behavior are inadequate to our present needs for
 legislation, he has succeeded wonderfully, and the forgoing ought not
 be taken as doubting that in the least. But he seems also to be thinking
 about how things ought to be-what a replacement theory of legisla-
 tion should look like-and here it seems to me that he and others build-
 ing on his work must carry through on his insight. Precisely because
 the new legislation is intransitive and interactive, a new theory of legis-
 lation must consider Congress and its functioning in systemic context.
 How and with what resources it operates needs to be realistically con-
 sidered, as must its relations with all the other actors of government.
 What controls it is as important an inquiry as how it might control
 others.
 IV. AN EXAMPLE: THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
 The example of the legislative veto illustrates all three themes of
 these comments-the implications of Congress's bigness, the necessary
 issues of presidential role, and the possibility that some aspects of dele-
 gation and void-for-vagueness will remain useful in an intransitive era.
 Professor Rubin is persuasive that the formalist critique of the legisla-
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 tive veto, based on presuppositions of transitive legislative action, is
 weak. We should accept, also, his proposition that "one important
 norm for the modern legislative process is that the legislature exercise
 political control over administrative agencies."61 The legislative veto is
 one example of such a control-one that, indeed, he appears to favor.
 Suppose we were to view the legislative veto, however, through a lens
 accepting of the need for continuing political controls but concerned
 nonetheless with the issues that have been raised: relationship to the
 presidency; visibility and tendency to faction; and forward impact on
 the functioning of Congress generally. Would we conclude that a mod-
 ernist theory of legislation should entail the legislative veto, in one or
 more of its several forms?
 At the outset, we ought to define just which "legislative veto" we
 are addressing. Historically, it came in many forms and was employed
 in a variety of contexts, and the analysis suggested could vary among
 them. Take two examples: A provision that independent regulatory
 commission rules do not take effect if, within thirty legislative days of
 their promulgation either branch of Congress has adopted a resolution
 of disapproval; and a provision authorizing the President to reallocate
 appropriated funds to a project otherwise prohibited by a budgetary
 restriction if the relevant subcommittee does not object. The first of
 these provisions is quite formal, requiring the whole of a chamber to
 act in the public forum and reducing to that extent concerns about fac-
 tion and responsibility; the action affected by the veto directly affects
 the public; the President is at least arguably excluded from the over-
 sight process, suggesting possible separation-of-powers concerns; a
 veto, if exercised, will likely shape future agency action in other pro-
 ceedings, without having changed any statutory provision; the very
 prospect of a veto may chill agency action by increasing agency-staff
 interactions;62 and the possibility of reserving a veto may influence how
 diligently future Congresses perform their legislative function. The lat-
 ter of these provisions is informal, reflecting a process that is likely to
 occur in private and that will be influenced by only a few members; yet
 the public is not directly affected; the President is a direct participant in
 any dealings with the subcommittee and must concur for the change to
 take place; and it is hard to imagine how a subcommittee's reserved
 authority to permit reallocation would shape future behavior, detract
 from presidential authority or discourage future congressional dili-
 gence.63 The paragraphs following focus on the first form of legislative
 61. Id. at 408.
 62. See supra text accompanying note 26.
 63. Appropriations are annual statutes, considerably more transitory than ordinary
 statutes, but nonetheless binding on the executive. Their annual nature gives them,
 from the beginning, more of a negotiated character. The form of restriction under dis-
 cussion ("The Secretary may spend none of the funds hereby appropriated on [a de-
 scribed project] unless . .") reflects an initial stance of disapproval of the President's
 446  [Vol. 89:427
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.30 on Thu, 28 Apr 2016 19:56:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 COMMENTS ON RUBIN
 veto, although they include occasional comparisons with the second.
 Such a veto was involved in Consumer Energy Council of America v.
 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,64 one of two D.C. Circuit opinions
 finding legislative veto provisions unconstitutional that were summarily
 affirmed by the Supreme Court the week following its Chadha decision.
 At issue was the House of Representatives' legislative veto of a rule
 adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)under
 the "incremental pricing" provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
 1978 (NGPA). 65 The NGPA had been enacted with difficulty during
 the Carter Administration, with the closest controversy resolved in the
 House (which eventually adopted the veto resolution) by only a single
 vote. The controversy arose in substantial part, it appeared, because of
 doubts about the incremental pricing policy (and the general deregula-
 tion of natural gas prices it represented). A legislative veto over certain
 incremental pricing rules was seen as one of the elements necessary to
 persuade a reluctant Congress to enact the bill. When FERC adopted
 an incremental pricing rule in 1979 and sent it to Congress for possible
 legislative veto, the debates revealed little doubt about whether the
 agency had acted within its intended discretion under the Act; the senti-
 ments predominantly expressed were that the Act itself had been a mis-
 take, and so its implementation ought to be blocked by a legislative
 veto.66 Unlike the NGPA, the resolution permitted only a vote for or
 against; it embodied no text to be debated, possibly amended, and put
 into effect.
 Running through the court's reasoning in disapproving the legisla-
 tive veto in this case was a theme of relationship to the question of
 delegation. Legislative vetoes that had been accepted by the Executive
 even reluctantly-over reorganization acts, in the context of foreign af-
 fairs-had two characteristics, the court observed: they emphasized the
 program that could otherwise be lifted only by statute. Deciding to permit the lifting of
 such restrictions informally, it could be argued, enhances the overall flexibility of the
 budgetary/appropriations process and weakens neither the President nor the Congress.
 See Strauss, Was There A Baby in the Bath Water? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
 Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke LJ. 789, 812-17. Strikingly, legislative veto provi-
 sions of this character are still frequently enacted. Louis Fisher in an April 1987 report
 for the Congressional Research Service, "Legislative Vetoes Enacted After Chadha,"
 counted 102 legislative vetoes enacted after Chadha, virtually all of this type.
 The appropriations context is, perhaps relatedly, one of extraordinary reliance on
 legislative history enforced by politics. Appropriations statutes most often do not spec-
 ify detailed spending directives; these directives appear in the committee reports. While
 it has asserted its formal independence from these prescriptions, the White House has
 generally gone along. Miller Acts to End Feud With Hill Over Funding, The Washing-
 ton Post, July 12, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
 64. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
 Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
 65. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
 ?? 3301-3342 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
 66. 673 F.2d at 468-69.
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 standardlessness of the original legislation, and they occurred in consti-
 tutional contexts in which such standardlessness might be of lesser con-
 cern. Government reorganizations do not directly affect private
 persons; the President and Congress share the foreign affairs function
 in complex ways; use of the veto device promotes flexibility without
 threatening either executive or legislative function. The rulemaking
 authority delegated to FERC, on the other hand, was authority directly
 to govern the affairs of private individuals. To be valid, even under the
 weak form in which "delegation" still survives, a statute had to promise
 an administrative process that assured rulishness, against which the
 conformity of agency action could be assessed. In effect, the courts had
 to be in a position to assure themselves that however diffusely Congress
 may have defined a reservation, there was a reservation off which the
 agency was not to stray and the courts would be in a position to say on
 the basis of reasoned analysis whether or not an agency had wandered.
 "Arguments that Congress actually decided nothing whatsoever about
 ... incremental pricing" would raise "serious" delegation questions.67
 But the tendency of permitting a legislative veto would be precisely to
 permit Congress to decide "nothing whatsoever;" the need to articu-
 late standards would be all the less if, once an agency had attempted to
 act, Congress had free and unreasoned opportunities to vote approval
 or disapproval of the choices the agency had made.
 This way of viewing the transaction also highlighted for the court
 the manner in which the veto would work to undercut the general pur-
 pose of the Constitution's framers to make "the legislative power ...
 difficult to employ"68 and their specific purpose to assure the President
 an important role in the process. Congress might be encouraged to use
 the legislative veto, not only because it makes its work easier (members
 would then not have to work so hard to come to resolution as they
 would on standards to be applied finally, with full legal effect, by
 others), but also because it saps the President's veto. He might try to
 block the initial decision of "nothing whatsoever," but if that failed he
 would have no control over Congress's choice whether or not to block
 agency action when the agency subsequently adopted a policy. Here is
 a technique that, if permitted, could destroy the constitutional veto.
 This impact was underscored by the consideration that the agency in-
 volved in the particular case, FERC, was an independent regulatory
 commission, generally understood to be rather more removed from
 presidential oversight and control than run-of-the-mill executive agen-
 cies.69 "The fundamental justification for making agencies independ-
 ent is that . . . political interference is undesirable. By then turning
 around and asserting that this independence is a justification for the
 one-house veto, Congress attempts simultaneously to decrease the
 67. Id. at 467.
 68. Id. at 464.
 69. Id. at 470-479.
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 power of the Executive and increase its own power."70
 Finally, the court looked explicitly at the issue of congressional
 oversight.
 When Congress conducts investigations or hearings, or enacts
 a "report and wait" requirement, or threatens to reduce ap-
 propriations, or imposes reporting requirements, or engages
 in other modes of oversight, its ability to influence the agency
 derives almost entirely from its ability to pass a statute requir-
 ing a different agency action or reducing the agency's appro-
 priations. These oversight methods enable Congress to
 inquire "into past executive branch action in order to influence
 future executive branch performance." [Under the legislative
 veto,] Congress is able to expand its role from one of over-
 sight, with an eye to legislative revision, to one of shared
 administration.7
 And, the court went on to note, it ought not be easily assumed that
 Congress's power would be limited to the chamber acting. "The one-
 house veto also increases sharply the negotiating power of individual
 congressmen or committees in seeking to direct administrative out-
 comes."72 That judgment is easily accepted and entails factional poli-
 tics that are both uncontrolled (because likely private) and severe.
 This last point, that legislative vetoes would enhance committee
 power, suggests a connection to the problem of congressional size that
 warrants equal concern. Here might be an impetus to further enlarge-
 ment of the already swollen congressional bureaucracy. To be sure,
 one might argue that legislative vetoes, if available, would displace (by
 reducing the necessity for) other, more covert forms of oversight. Yet
 in my judgment, particularly in the present context of Republican-Dem-
 ocrat struggles for control of the agencies from the White House and
 Capitol Hill, the threat of a possible veto would arm more, not less,
 covert activity. Political responsibility for committee communications
 to the agencies would be at best problematic, with the problems being
 resolved (to the extent they could be) by supervisory efforts on the part
 of members of Congress that would necessarily subtract further from
 the time available to them for directly legislative work. Given the pri-
 vate, bureaucratic, and fractional (likely factional) nature of those com-
 munications, and the unexplained nature of any resulting veto, any idea
 that a legislative-veto regime would be constrained to the enforcement
 of pre-existing congressional intentions about statutory meaning is chi-
 merical. It would be an arena for current politics.
 Even if one grants, then, that it may be necessary to set one bu-
 reaucracy to catch another, that the size of government generally beg-
 gars its direct control by elected individuals, one still must ask why that
 70. Id. at 472.
 71. Id. at 474 (footnotes omitted).
 72. Id. at 475 n.213.
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 watchdog bureaucracy should be distributed among the politically frac-
 tured Congress, rather than placed in the politically unified office of the
 President.73 Coherence remains a desirable end in government,
 whether Congress can supply it directly or must leave its working out to
 others. The case that the 535 members of Congress, with their army of
 more than twenty thousand bureaucrats, can supply that coherence by
 oversight remains to be made.
 Finally, consider what Professor Fuller's analysis might suggest
 about whether a legislative-administrative system should include the leg-
 islative veto. Professor Rubin recognizes that that analysis may have a
 good deal more to say to us about the desirable qualities of a system of
 law than about the desirable qualities of statutes as such, and with that
 judgment it is hard to disagree. He suggests that in general the system
 of intransitive statutes supplemented by rules does meet Fuller's de-
 mands; one might add that that system without the legislative veto-
 that is to say, with the agency having authority to act pursuant to its
 mandate, subject only to ordinary political and judicial controls-pro-
 vides incentives for Congress to state the agency's authority, to the ex-
 tent possible, in ways that also support them. How would adding the
 veto change matters? One could believe that it would impair "general-
 ity" in two respects: by diminishing the need for initial standard-set-
 ting, it would reduce the rulishness of the initial legislative output; and
 the arbitrary and unexplained character of legislative vetoes when exer-
 cised would frustrate any description of the overall system as operating
 in terms of general rules. "Promulgation," making the law "readily
 available," is similarly impaired: Congress has less reason to write stat-
 utes initially in a way that will make them accessible to the public; it is,
 to that extent, able to operate in secret, without either revealing its pol-
 icy choices or being bound to treat agency choices made under delega-
 tion in any coherent way. While delegation to agencies provides,
 overall, a defensible means both for avoiding contradiction and impos-
 sibility and for securing constancy and congruence, the veto would un-
 dercut these qualities as well.
 Is this the Congress we want-one with diminished incentives to
 reach whateverjudgments might be possible on legislative issues, fewer
 reasons to accommodate the President, enhanced capacities to disrupt
 administration, and diminished political responsibility for the controls
 those associated with it may exercise over government? Few would dis-
 agree with Professor Rubin that we must accept the intransitivity of
 contemporary legislative action and seek a theory of legislation that will
 acknowledge it. Congressional scholars have no difficulty in finding in-
 stitutional incentives pointing strongly in the direction of individual or
 small-group casework, rather than the elusive business of coalition-
 73. See, e.g., National Academy of Pub. Admin., supra note 40, at 23 (more appro-
 priate congressional role is oversight of OMB).
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 building, as the preferred congressional task.74 The formulation of a
 new theory might include, as one of its tasks, the possibility of institu-
 tional structures or demands that would push back toward collective
 action. My concern is that, in pursuing that task, we do not abandon an
 interest in having Congress function as a legislature, in preserving the
 place of the President and (more broadly) what remains vital about our
 notions of separation of powers, or in accommodating the impact of
 bureaucraticization in government generally in ways that do not com-
 pound its problems.
 CONCLUSION
 Rubin succeeds in persuading us that the traditional equation of
 "legislation" and "law" is problematic in the administrative state-that
 legislation is more often concerned with the (other) organs of govern-
 ment from which "law" emerges than with its direct formulation. Yet
 even if we accept this as a natural development, not a disease of which
 the body politic should be purged, the relationships between those re-
 sponsible for "legislation" and those responsible for "law" should be a
 matter of active concern. Our wish for law, for conditions that will con-
 duce to its creation, remains relevant to any theories we may hold for
 legislation. If delegation and void-for-vagueness, for example, do not
 serve well as direct measures of the worth or validity of legislative prod-
 ucts, they continue to embody systemic values deserving of respect and
 consequently influencing our notions of appropriate relations between
 the legislative and law making efforts to the extent those are distinct.
 An insight that properly turns our attention from performance to con-
 trol needs to notice how various options on the placement or exercise
 of control may affect the law-character of the system's ultimate output.
 Congress is not the only institution controlling, and the new theory for
 which Rubin calls must be concerned both with separation-of-powers
 questions concerning the appropriate allocation of controls across the
 whole of government, and the probable impact on Congress's legislat-
 ing of the various kinds of controls that might be imagined. While to-
 day's theory of legislation must be differentiated from our theory of
 law, one cannot free one from the other. Professor Rubin's analysis
 pays insufficient heed to the continuing relationships.
 74. R. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (1978). See gener-
 ally the essays collected in Parts I and IV of Congress: Structure and Policy, supra note
 1.
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